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The purpose of this discussion is to emphasize the confusion,
inequities, and maladjustments to social and economic realities
presently existing in the marital property law of Louisiana. The
belief of the writer in the community system is strong because
its basic pattern is designed to stabilize and protect the family.
It envisions an ultimate equal sharing in the financial gains of
two people working for a mutual interest. This object is protec-
ted, as is any well organized business, by provision for a sinking
fund to sustain the endeavor in case of loss by an unsuccessful
venture of one partner. The fact that this fund was labelled
separate property of the wife was not to favor her unduly but
because, in the setting of an earlier day, that was the safest
method of protection for all concerned. Re-examination of the
community property system has been thought necessary for quite
some time because its adherents fear that, without adjustment to
present conditions, dissatisfactions may become sufficiently acute
to result in its abandonment.' Its complexities 2 are so great that
its acceptability can be maintained only by clear demonstration of
achievement of its worthy basic objects, those best strengthening
the ties and economic basis of the family.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. For reasons similar to those advanced here, France in 1945 engaged
in a revision of her Civil Code. Marital property laws have been examined.
In his article, The Revision of the French Civil Code, 25 TULANE L. REV. 435,
444 (1951), Dr. Marc Ancel states ". . . the old community property system ...
now receives little support in France." A compromise appears to have been
reached between the old community law and a system of entire separation
of property, according to Dr. Ancel. Definite action to allay apparent dis-
satisfactions is being taken in the State of New Mexico. See N.M. Laws 1953,
21st Sess., Sen. Res. No. 3, p. 636. See also Professor R. E. Clark's excellent
study, Management and Control of Community Property in New Mexico, 26
TULANE L. REV. 324 (1952).
2. See Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Prop-
erty in Louisiana, 27 TULANE L. REV. 143 (1953). See Professor de Funiak's
statements regarding abandonment of the system, 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES
OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 20, nn. 18, 19 (1943).
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Before a presentation of legislative enactments and judicial
decisions, may it be said that the writer has no interest in what
is "his" and "hers" as such except insofar as these ownerships
may affect the stability and tranquillity of the family, which a
majority still believes to be the best institution for society. This
paper does not purport to present Wife versus Husband with a
brief for the "rights" of women or men. Its spirit is in the interest
of the earnings of a man or woman by labor, profession, or small
business whose failure may presently drag down the married
partner and thus wreck the entire financial structure of the
family and perhaps the marriage.
Stress is placed here on the small business because large
concerns ordinarily have constant access to legal advice and are
made aware of dangers and pitfalls and hence seek protection
through the corporate device or otherwise. Professor de Funiak
stresses the fact that loyal, hard-working couples even of prim-
itive times evolved the system out of recognition of fair dealing
and ordinary justice and for individual satisfaction as a demo-
cratic concept. Not the great property owners but couples strug-
gling to attain some degree of financial security are those for
whom these suggested changes are today worst needed.
The community has been consistently held not to be a
business partnership or the marriage partner entitled to the legal
reliefs established therefor. Yet, under present property laws it
would appear that many liabilities of a partnership are present
without the assets enjoyed by that device.4 To aver that irrita-
tions and strains, frustrations and dissatisfactions arise when
property which one believes to be his own is interfered with is
to concur with a majority in North America. Dogs and many
other animals will defend their property lines, their bed and their
bone. Thus the idea of'ownership must be deeply ingrained in the
animal world of which man is thought to be the apex, and hence
it would not appear to be illogical to suppose that marital prop-
erty laws as other property laws of men and women may produce
those factors which tend to lead to the disruption of their associa-
tions in business and, far more importantly, in marriage.
3. DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 23 et seq.
(1945).
4. Art. 2807, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870; Heatwole v. Stansbury, 212 La. 685, 33
So.2d 196 (1947); Mackenroth v. Pelke, 171 La. 842, 132 So. 365 (1931); Frier-
son v. Frierson, 164 La. 687, 114 So. 594 (1927); Succession of Boyer, 36 La.
Ann. 506 (1884); City Insurance Co. v. Steamboat Lizzie Simmons, 19 La. Ann.
249 (1867); Squire v. Belden, 2 La. 268 (1831).
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The community property pattern was designed by those well
versed in the intricacies and imponderables of that unique asso-
ciation known as marriage. It still obtains in many of the so-
called civilized countries of the world, though Professor de
Funiak points out that economic causes and not "civilization"
produced the plan. 5 The major thoughts of Louisiana formulators
had to do with protection of the family and its economy of the
times before the days of easy and frequent divorce which indeed
may settle property questions, a minor matter in comparison to
problems of the mind and spirit, which seem to be even more
confused after the parties leave the divorce court.
The community property system was not only in the day of
its inception (as previously stated) but is even now in the
writer's judgment the fairest, most thoughtfully designed plan
for marital property law yet devised. To weaken the confidence
of its adherents by failure to adjust it to economic and social
conditions revolutionized since the pattern was first adopted for
Louisiana would seem to be most unwise, and would perhaps
result in irreparable loss to the state as well as to its individual
citizens. The philosophy of Louisiana's Civil Code clearly be-
speaks the family unit idea and attempts to protect the institu-
tion.6 It was not in the minds of the law makers of that day that,
if the spouses could not get along because of difference of opinion
on financial matters, they should be encouraged to get a divorce.
The consideration of such a step was not in contemplation due to
social and other taboos-nor was it considered good family law
or business practice to have all of the eggs in one basket so that
a financial slip of the husband would leave the whole family,
including him, with nothing.7
Legislation and its Judicial Interpretations
In the early part of this century, law makers were anxious
to recognize women's contributions and the country's need of
them in business and industry and a little later they may have
been attempting to reward their services in the first world war.8
Mechanization, generally, produced tools for war and peace,
many of which could be handled as well or better by women
5. 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 27 (1943).
6. Ncte elaborate provisions for collation and forced heirship.
7. Provisions for dotal and paraphernal property of wife, marital portion,
protection when separate regime contracted for.
8. WOMEN'S BUREAU BULL. No. 249, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES (U.S. Dep't Labor 1953).
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than men, and realization of the existence of this great dormant
labor force came quickly to the country's leaders.
As an integral part of this movement a series of Louisiana
statutes popularly called married women's emancipatory acts
appeared. 9 These provisions cleared away old limitations and
protective devices and granted full power to married women in
the way of privileges and responsibilities that were available to
any person sui juris in regard to his property, or in regard to his
ability to act in various civil capacities.
However, to prevent confusion in connection with the exist-
ing legal fabric of community property law, a statement was
carried through this series of acts that they did not purport
to affect the provisions dealing with this type of property. 10
During the period previously alluded to, and a forerunner and
preconcomitant to the series and again in recognition of the
increasing part that women were taking in the world of business
and industry, what later seemed to be a companion piece of
legislation was passed in 1912, reading as follows:
"The-earnings of the wife when living apart from her
husband although not separated by judgment of court, her
earnings when carrying on a business, trade, occupation or
industry separate from her husband, actions for damages
resulting from offenses and quasi offenses and the property
purchased with all funds thus derived, are her separate
property."'1
The amendment was properly placed in the article of the Code
dealing with the separate property of the spouses and was
generally understood to complement the so-called emancipatory
series.' 2
Twenty-one years later, interpretation of this amendment
was directly asked of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.'8 The high
mood of gratitude for services performed in the first world war
had passed for everyone: a terrible economic depression was
being suffered; jobs were scarce for all; creditors were des-
perately trying to collect; and it was normal in the general
avenues of thought to find reversals of position. Moreover, the
9. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIX; La. Acts 1916, No. 94, p. 212; La. Acts 1918,
No. 244, p. 435; La. Acts 1920, No. 219, p. 364; La. Acts 1921, No. 34, p. 38; La.
Acts 1926, No. 132, p. 207; La. Acts 1928, No. 283, p. 548.
10. Ibid.
11. La. Acts 1912, No. 170, p. 310.
12. Art. 2334, LA. Civit CODE of 1870.
13. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
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Justices readily perceived that, regardless of the legislature's
best intentions to recognize the place that married women were
taking in business and industry, the method employed would
weaken the community structure as well as producing greater
inequities between spouses. 14 Hence, chivalrous tongued judges
who had spoken of married women as being most favored in the
law became silent and the Supreme Court decided 5 that the wife
was not able to earn any separate property unless she was living
separate and apart from her husband, presumably under condi-
tions which would warrant a judicial separation or divorce. 6
Moreover, a wife could not sue on a contract the benefits of
which would accrue to the community. 7 Though she was per-
fectly capable under the emancipatory acts of entering un-
assisted into the contract and her husband was a stranger to it,
he, as master of the community, must sue. Again, the theory of
a "public merchant"' s was expanded to cover manufacturing
and the husband and community held solidarily with the wife
for unfortunate ventures of the wife in this type of business.' 9
Presumably, if all earnings or profits of the wife in a separate
business, profession, or industry are community, losses also,
even in a tort rising out of a contract, would be community,
under some indeterminate form of agency doctrine, 20 perhaps
ratification by acceptance of benefits if there have been any
benefits!
Thus began the march of the one basket theory with a veiled
concomitant of invitation to divorce or judicial separation as the
only suggested means of relief.21 Neither spouse today has legal 22
control over the other and even under the best adjusted marital
14. 177 La. 237, 265, 148 So. 37, 45 (1933).
15. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
16. See concurring opinion by Chief Justice O'Niell, 177 La. 237, 266, 148
So. 37, 45 (1933). "1 believe that all that the Legislature intended to do by the
act of 1912 was to allow a wife who Is living separate and apart from her
husband to retain her earnings as her separate property. Whenever the
husband tires of such a situation, he may put an end to It by service of the
necessary summons upon his wife to return to the matrimonial domicile, or
suffer the consequence."
17. Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933).
18. Art. 131, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
19. Charles Lob's Sons v. Karnofsky, 177 La. 229, 148 So. 34 (1933).
20. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937); McClure v. McMartin,
104 La. 496, 29 So. 227 (1901); Art. 2985, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Note, 20
TULANE L. REV. 279 (1945). See reversal of policy re automobiles: Brantley v.
Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 46 So.2d 614 (1950), 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 94 (1951).
21. See statement of Chief Justice O'Niell reproduced in note 16 supra.
22. No authorization required under so-called emancipation acts. See




relations, where each spouse is working hard for the financial
interests of the family, if bad fortune falls upon the efforts of the
one, the other will fall. As a spiritual postulate, this may be
acceptable; but as an economic and social one, it would appear
to be of doubtful value. The growth in numbers of small busi-
nesses, as, for example, shoppes, notably tea, beauty, gift, hobby,
and the like, is valuable to society economically and otherwise,
and is encouraged even by national legislation.2 They are often
run by married women. Financially responsible husbands under
our present legislation must watch the balance sheets, if any,
with extreme care.
It will be recalled that legislation in 185524 was passed in
the interest of commerce and not just to free the wife dealing
with separate property of legal limitations. It resulted in shifting
the burden of proof from creditors who had formerly had to
show that money and supplies had inured to the benefit of the
wife's property to the wife, who had to show that they had not.25
Thus, dealing with married women, many of them owning the
great inherited plantations of that day, was made safer. It is
submitted again, not necessarily in the interest of the wife but
of the economics of the state, particularly the small business, as
well as for the family welfare and unity, a more valuable asset
of the state, that thoughtful legislation is needed. The two-income
family increases purchasing power and tax collections. A United
States labor report for 1953 indicates agreement that this devel-
opment is accompanied by an increase in homeowners, thus
"having a profound effect on family life: more stability, more
sense of property, more feeling of 'belonging' to economic so-
ciety.' 26
Referring again to the legislative mood of empowering mar-
ried women, another attempt provided that, if community prop-
erty stood in the name of the wife, the husband could not sell
or mortgage it without the wife's written authority or consent.2
23. Exec. Order No. 10493, 18 FED. REG. 6583 (1953); Exec. Order No.
10504, 18 FED. REQ. 7667 (1953). An "Institute on Small Business Planning and
Loans" was held at the University of North Carolina Law School, January
15 and 16, under the joint sponsorship of the North Carolina Bar Association
and the law schools of Duke University, the University of North Carolina,
and Wake Forest College.
24. La. Acts 1855, No. 200, p. 254.
25. Berwick v. Sheriff, 49 La. Ann. 201, 21 So. 692 (1896); Dougherty v.
Hibernia Ins. Co., 35 La. Ann. 629 (1883); Rice v. Alexander, 15 La. Ann. 54
(1860); Arts. 127, 128, 129, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
26. WOMEN'S BUREAU BULL. No. 249, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 13 (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1953).
27. La. Acts 1912, No. 170, p. 310.
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Our Supreme Court, quickly stepping to what they must have
thought to be the rescue of the community property system, held
that neither could the wife sell or mortgage the property without
the husband's written consent. 2 To go further, the court also
held that property standing in the joint names of husband and
wife could be dealt with solely by the husband.
29
Two decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana declared
cancellation of mineral leases upon community property because
payments were made to the joint bank accounts of husband and
wife rather than to the account of the husband alone, as the wife
could have drawn the money, though she made no attempt to do
so.30 The harshness of these decisions may have later been soft-
ened somewhat as to effect upon a lessee,3 1 but nonetheless stand
as illustrations of the extreme need for care when a wife enters
even indirectly into a contract concerning community property.
Purchasers from a married woman purporting to deal with
her separate property are naturally loath to accept title unless
the husband's signature appears, since her recitation that the
property is separate is subject to proof; 2 and if it fails, under a
commingling doctrine or otherwise, 3 title falls. Thus, the so-
called married women's emancipatory acts with their limitation
as to dealing with community property result, practically, in
making it perhaps more rather than less difficult than before
their advent for a married woman to deal even with her separate
property though the need for assistance by her husband was
stated in the provisions to have been eliminated.
If the wife recites in a deed of transfer that she is selling
her separate property and it is proved to be community property,
the husband's signature "authorizing" his wife will estop him to
claim later that the property is community,3 4 but will not estop
28. Bywater v. Enderle, 175 La. 1098, 145 So. 118 (1932).
29. Otwell v. Vaughan, 186 La. 911, 173 So. 527 (1937); Young v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co., 184 La. 460, 166 So. 139 (1936).
30. Clingman v. Devonian Oil Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937); LeRosen
v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930). See La. Acts
1896, No. 63, p. 96.
31. Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So.2d 34 (1948),
23 TULANE L. REV. 418 (1949).
32. Johnson v. Johnson, 213 La. 1092, 36 So.2d 396 (1948); DAGoETT, THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 34, n. 12 (1945).
33. De Maupassant v. Clayton, 214 La. 812, 38 So.2d 791 (1949); Johnson v.
Johnson, 213 La. 1092, 36 So.2d 396 (1948); Marlatt v. Citizens' State Bank &
Trust Co., 180 La. 387, 156 So. 426 (1934).
34. Rousseau v. Rousseau, 209 La. 428, 24 So.2d 676 (1946); Normand v.
Davis, 202 La. 565, 12 So.2d 273 (1943); Succession of Hostetter, 128 La. 468,
54 So. 961 (1911); Kerwin v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 35 La. Ann. 33 (1883).
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the forced heirs who have accepted with benefit of inventory
nor will it affect the rights of creditors of the husband and the
community. 5 Again, if the husband authorizes the wife to sell,
and her proof of separate property fails, title has been held good
under an agency theory, namely, that the community for which
she is acting is selling. 6 Under this analysis the husband's au-
thorizing signature would appear to be more than a mere estop-
pel against him to claim that the property is community and
not the wife's separate property if her recitation is untrue, and
will validate the title. An application of this view would seem
to protect the purchaser not only against the husband by estop-
pel but also after his death against forced heirs of the husband,
who might accept his succession under benefit of inventory and
thus not be bound by his estoppel. Conveyancers rightly fear,
however, to rely on this theory, as agency of the wife is an un-
certain doctrine.8 7
If the husband recites an appearance and signs the deed as
joint seller, a practice used in some offices, doubtless the vendee
is nicely protected whether the property is community or sep-
arate. But what of the family, if indeed the property is the wife's
separate property? Could either the husband or wife upon dis-
solution of the community successfully maintain even that a debt
was owed by the community for the whole or the half of the
value received to the separate estate of the wife for her benefit
or that of her heirs?38
Even the "faith of the public record" doctrine works to the
detriment of the wife's commercial standing in the line of cases
not comprehended in the doctrine. The general rule was purport-
edly settled for all time and everybody in 1910 by the landmark
case of McDuffie v. Walker,8 9 said to have been followed ever
since in unbroken line of judicial decisions. 40 Those cases where
faith alone does not save the relying purchaser are said to be
those where property vests "by operation of law."41 When does
35. Chevalley v. Pettit, 115 La. 407, 39 So. 113 (1905); McKenzie v. Bacon,
40 La. Ann. 157, 4 So. 65 (1888). Cf. Berry v. Wagner, 151 La. 456, 91 So. 837
(1922).
36. Garlick v. Dalboy, 147 La. 18, 84 So. 441 (1920).
37. See Dimmer v. Davis Bros. Lumber Co., 135 So. 684 (La. App. 1931);
DAGOETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 20 et seq. (1945).
38. See Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community
Property in Louisiana, 27 TULANE L. REV. 143 (1953).
39. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910).
40. Cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 211 La. 468, 30 So.2d 321 (1947); Knoblock
& Rainold v. Posey, 126 La. 610, 52 So. 847 (1910).
41. Bishop v. Copeland, 222 La. 284, 62 So.2d 486 (1953).
1954]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the law "operate" is obviously the question, puzzling occasionally
even to the learned in the great science. When a person dies, his
forced heirs and indeed his legal heirs are vested by operation
of law with their proper share of inheritance; and the purchaser,
even relying on a recorded judgment placing the vendor in pos-
session of property belonging to these heirs and not to the seller,
will not be protected, though there is nothing in the record to
give notice of the right of the heirs. 42 Upon dissolution of the
community by death of one of the spouses, the heirs of the de-
ceased are vested by operation of law with his half of the com-
munity property.48
Those cases dealing with the latter "operation" obviously
may be distinguished on law, fact, procedural approach and
otherwise as may perhaps too many cases, it would sometimes
seem; but in stark reality the result is that on occasion a married
man swearing to a lie of singleness passed a good title under the
record doctrine, his divorce not having been recorded, to the
wife's half of the community; 44 under similar facts, however,
the wife,45 as usurper of the husband's power during marriage
was not able to deal validly regardless of "operation of law,"
which presumably vests shares of community property upon
dissolution of the community by divorce,46 because of the power
of the husband concept. The soundness of the several decisions
is not in issue-only the effect upon those who would deal with
a married woman. Their fears would appear to be well justified.
Retail merchants are hounded by the spectre of that elastic
word "necessities ' '47 with which a husband must furnish his wife.
This responsibility would seem to result chiefly from responsi-
bilities of a husband as such, in or out of a community r6gime,
and hence may be less troublesome than community use ratifi-
cation by the husband of articles not in the necessity group, pur-
chased by the wife.48 There is little chance for the creditor if
the husband proves adamant in his refusal to ratify after being
42. Ibid. But see Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103, 52 So.2d 437 (1951).
See also Lee v. Jones, 69 So.2d 26 (La. 1953); but see Thompson v. Thompson,
211 La. 468, 30 So.2d 321 (1947).
43. Allen v. Anderson, 55 So.2d 596 (La. App. 1951).
44. Humphreys v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So.2d 220 (1949).
45. Succession of James, 147 La. 943, 86 So. 403 (1920).
46. Art. 2406, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Daggett, Division of Property Upon
Dissolution of Marriage, 6 LAw & CONTEMP.' PROB. 225 (1939).
47. Art. 1786, LA. CIVIL CODS of 1870; D. H. Holmes Co. v. Morris, 188 La.
431, 177 So. 417 (1937).
48. For an excellent record illustration, see Montgomery v. Gremillion,
69 So.2d 618 (La. App. 1953).
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apprised of the purchase. On the other hand there is little chance
for the husband's escape from liability unless he can promptly
capture the articles and send them back, which may result in
serious impairment of his personal domestic felicity. A merchant
may well desire the custom of women with good jobs or success-
ful professions. The woman may retain her maiden name, which
she has a legal right 49 to do, if recognition in her field of endeavor
has come before marriage. The unsuspecting merchant may ulti-
mately find this apparently excellent risk a poor one, indeed,
by virtue of an unknown marriage and the Houghton-Hall
edict. 50
Garaishment 5' would seem to lie for debts of the husband
and community against the wagesof a wife who is trying to aid
and comfort a husband failing in health, finance, or otherwise
and unwilling to desert him. Question has been raised regarding
the right of creditors of a dischargd a rupt to continue col-
lections against an employed'Wife, not personally discharged. A
very sound theory of the community as an ideal being, likened
unto a succeson, has been established by the Supreme Court52
and is certainly well supported by the theory of community
property in its entirety. This concept should negate the idea of
holdinga wife for co mmunity .. ebs after the husband head of
t ommunty~hdisc1__hged in-bankruptcy. However,
these situations as items on this list for discussion certainly add
to the apparently increasing dissatisfaction with the present
state of the laws of marital property.
In the old basic law of community property appears elab-
orate machinery for a separation of property to be instigated
only by a wife.58 As a practical matter, and for the great ma-
jority of families, this recourse is of little value. The wife must
have separate proprty or the hope of it, and the husband's
financial affairs must be in such "disorder" that her estate will
be endangered. The husband whose separate or community busi-
ness may be endangered by the wife's financial "disorder" does
not have the right to such an action. Since the wife's earnings
from a business occupation or industry are community property,
it would not appear that she could bring the action to protect
thos earnings, if the husband's ventures were tottering. The
49. Succession of Knelpp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931).
50. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
51. LA. R.S. § 13:3911 et seq. (1950).
52. Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La. 603, 50 So.2d 208 (1950).
53. Art. 2425 9t seq., LA. CivNM CODE of"9O
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device always smacked of a garage-locking after the car was
stolen, anyway, and is of little value except as the one means of
dissolving the community after marriage without disturbing the
personal relationship. 54 Loyal wives have always furnished
money if they had it to husbands in financial stress, if they
wanted it, even when pledging for their husbands' debts was
prohibited.55 The law makers knew that, as witness the devices
for protection of this family sinking fund in the separation of
property idea," the wife's legal mortgage,57 and other less ob-
vious provisions.
Separate property of the spouses is that which is received
by inheritance or by particular gift, inter vivos or mortis causa.58
Separate earnings of the wife while living separate from her
husband apparently with cause for judicial separation or divorce,
are her separate property.59 The first square decision ° was that
the wife gained a separate estate from earnings in a house of
prostitution to which her husband brought his custom but not
as her exclusive client and where he was treated according to
the testimony as was any other person, and was ejected "when
his money ran out." What a platform of vulgarity upon which
the court was forced to rest the first direct application of the
doctrine!
A recent case has stated the test of the phrase "living sep-
arate and apart" with effect of making the wife's earnings
separate property to be the same as that applied for divorce
under the two-year act. The parties must so live that there can
be no doubt in the minds of citizens as to the breakdown of all
personal relationships. Thus, a wife who had sheltered her sick
husband in a building upon the grounds of her adjacent board-
ing house could not label her earnings as separate.6 1
It is indeed unfortunate that the private lives of persons who
have not seen fit to expose to public view in court the innermost
secrets of their personal relationships should have these matters
54. DAGOETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 57 et seq.
(1945).
55. Art. 2398 et seq., LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, negated by emancipatory acts.
See note 9 supra.
56. Art. 2425 et seq., LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 57 et seq. (1945).
57. DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA, 44 et seq.
(1945).
58. Art. 2334, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
59. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
60. Small v. McNeely, 195 So. 649 (La. App. 1940).
61. Succession of Le Jeune, 221 La. 437, 59 So.2d 446 (1952).
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reviewed on a property question.62 This reward by the state par-
ticularly to a wife who instead of seeking divorce and alimony
has gone to work in either the oldest or the newest profession
for. women seems peculiarly unfitting.
It is far from clear whether a wife living separate and apart
,having one of the many causes for judicial separation will be
able to accumulate separate property; whether the matter of
whose "fault" it is will be made a factor; whether under the
two-year act test earnings will become separate immediately
upon the beginning of separate living or after two years. Per-
haps the whole impossible situation will fall with the weight of
its own stupidity and thus one item of unbalance will be cleared
away without legislation. Despite the best efforts of the court,
however, but minor successes can be achieved within the present
legislative pattern to cure what the writer believes to be major
ills at the present time.
Recovery by the husband for injuries are his separate prop-
erty, if he is living separate and apart from his wife by reason
of her behavior.6 3 Previous to the Houghton-Hall64 analysis of
part of the 1912 statute65 discussed above, it was clear that re-
coveries for personal injuries to the wife were her separate
property in any case.66 Since that decision it seems doubtful, if
put at issue, whether under a later statute and the court's inter-
pretation of it the wife could insist successfully on the classifica-
tion as separate property without proving her living separate
and apart. Unless the court decides on an inconsistent interpreta-
tion of the latter part of the same paragraph, dealing with re-
coveries for "offenses and quasi offenses" to the wife, a living
separate and apart would be a requisite.6
Preservation of property as separate during the existence
of the community is another problem. In the case of the hus-
band, it is well settled that in order to retain the separate char-
acter in a purchase of realty with separate funds he must give
a double recitation in the deed to the effect that he is buying
62. See Daggett, What Future for Community Property Law in Louisiana,
4 SOUTHWESTERN L.J. 20, 23, 24 (1950). See also Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939,
41 So.2d 837 (1949) (marital portion).
63. La. Acts 1920, No. 186, p. 304, amending and re-enacting Art. 2334, LA.
CIvIL CODE of 1870.
64. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
65. La. Acts 1912, No. 170, p. 310.
66. La. Acts 1902, No. 68, p. 95, amending Art. 2402, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
67. La. Acts 1912, No. 170, p. 310.
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with his separate funds for his separate benefit.0 8 It is suggested
that in purchasing stocks, bonds, or other movables that this
recitation might be solemnly made before a notary and proper
witnesses concurrently with the purchase of movables and a
copy of the instrument attached to the evidence of title of the
movables. It is possible that this device might be effective in a
settlement between the spouses or their heirs at the termination
of the community. No test case can be cited at the moment.
Obviously it would not affect creditors as all of the husband's
property, separate or community, is available to separate and
community creditors. 69
Whatever the recitation by the wife to preserve title in her
separate estate, she must prove 70 it although the time-honored
rule is that she may introduce evidence outside of the instrument
to prove that the property is her separate property while the
husband may not do So.71 The question of uncertainty regardless
of recitation has been previously discussed. Also, it has been
demonstrated that a wife investing her separate property in a
business in which she labors, would seem not to be able to pre-
serve the earnings therefrom as they go into the community and
if the venture is unsuccessful will lose not only her original
investment of separate funds but reduce the community as well
under the public merchant theory coupled with the Houghton-
Hall decision.
Moreover, the wife apparently cannot maintain as separate
the earnings of her separate property under mere factual admin-
istration by herself because of the latest legislative edict unless
she files an instrument containing a double declaration of reser-
vation and intention.72 This legislation is said to have been
passed for tax reasons and to simplify proof. The tax reason, if
ever a sound one for family protective purposes, no longer exists
under modified tax rules regarding marital property.78 So far
68. DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 29 et seq.
(1945).
69. Id. at 50.
70. See note 32 supra.
71. Staunton v. Vinterella, 223 La. 958, 67 So.2d 550 (1953).
72. La. Acts 1944, No. 286, p. 836, amending Art. 2386, LA. CIVIL CODE of
1870.
73. Revenue Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 110 (1948). See § 351 (eliminating com-
munity property provisions of § 811(e) of the Internal Revenue Code); § 361
(adding the marital deduction provision to § 812(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code); and §§ 104(c) and 301 (providing for the splitting of income between
spouses by amending § 12(d) of the Internal Revenue Code). Rubin &
Champagne, Some Community Property Aspects of the 1948 Revenue Act, 9
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1 (1948).
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as the simplification of proof purpose is concerned, it might be
asked, simplification for whose benefit? Again, the answer would
be for those attacking on all fronts any and all family reserves
when the husband meets financial ill fortune.
Moreover, what is administration? It has been indicated that
the husband's administrative powers over the wife's property
include investment of funds, coming to his hands with conse-
quent result of shifting title to the community, an apparent devi-
ation from the accepted and legally protected theory of mere
administration found in dealing with minors and interdicts,
decedents' estates, absentees and other areas clearly distinguish-
ing administration from converted ownership.7 4
Suppose the wife does file the instrument required to pre-
serve her separate administration, where does administration
leave off and making her capital work as a business begin? The
line would seem to be quite hazy and, with what appears to be
fast becoming an irrebuttable presumption of community, it is
easy to predict with some degree of assurance which answer will
prevail.
Previously, with thought of encouraging small investors in
homestead associations, moneys deposited by a wife would be-
come her separate property regardless of the source of the
funds.7 5 No longer is this the case.76 This situation may not pre-
sent as strong a case as previously cited examples but is another
illustration of the trend to prevent the segregation of a fund to
protect the family from the ill winds of depressions, regressions,
running readjustments, economic dips, levelings off or whatever
be the current term for these unhappy events.
Thus, it would seem that we have legally gone "Onward to
Yesterday"'T7 or beyond while the world has continued ever
toward tomorrow with its tremendous changes, presumably an
advance in our social and economic life. Married women are in
general legally incapable of dealing with community property
and materially hampered in either acquiring or dealing with
their separate property. The trend of court decisions and recent
74. Succession of Schnitter, 220 La. 323, 56 So.2d. 563 (1951).
75. La. Acts 1902, No. 120, p. 195; La. Acts 1932, No. 140, p. 455.
76. Cameron v. Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So.2d 1 (1949); La. Acts 1938,
No. 337, p. 828; La. Acts 1940, No. 95, p. 443.
77. Said to be a favorite slogan of Wm. J. Nichols. Saturday Review of
Literature, Dec. 19, 1953, p. 9.
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legislation is to place all marital property in the community
classification. The results are submitted to be:
1. Deleterious to dealing with immovables because of the
uncertainty of title when property stands in the name of a
married woman and to commerce in movables purchased by the
wife under her mandate.
2. Deleterious to business growth because of the fear of
each spouse to venture lest all family assets may be lost.
3. Deleterious to family security as no protection is avail-
able to segregate the earnings of one spouse if the other is un-
successful.
4. Deleterious to marital tranquility because of lack of
control of earned property and formalities and insecurity of
separate property.
5. Deleterious to the state because of effect on marital rela-
tions leading to separation and divorce.
6. Deleterious to the state as it principally affects the mid-
dle class, financially speaking, understood to be the foundation
stone of the state's prosperity and stability.
7. Deleterious psychologically to an intelligent and indus-
trious wife to be classified on legal capacity with children and
mental defectives.
Possible Adjustments
It should be constantly borne in mind that the community
property idea is one of a sharing as equally as possible by the
spouses of the material accumulations of the period of the mar-
riage dimly reflecting the spiritual concept of the sharing of
the joys and sorrows of life itself. The enfolding of children
within the unit perfects the whole and protection of all types is
contemplated for each and every member of the group termed
the family.
(a) Control. Certainly the basic policy of the court in the
Houghton-Ha178 case was sound for, regardless of legislative
intent, devotion of all the energies of a spouse to building a sep-
arate estate at the expense of the other would destroy the com-
munity ideal as surely as any other method. Framers of the Code
foresaw the danger and provided the maritalportion, 79 which,
78. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
79. Art. 2382, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
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if interpreted in the light of its purpose and not with injection
of the "fault" theory, which is another invitation to divorce,
serves as some protection against a selfish spouse5 0
Equal division of accumulations as between the spouses or
their heirs must be maintained or the community plan aban-
doned. In all types of business association, settlement is con-
templated for occurrence at the completion of the joint enter-
prise or dissolution of the business association. Management or
control of the business while in operation is indeed another
matter. The oversimplified answer is sometimes given by pre-
sumably thoughtful persons that "every business has to have a
head," which apparently again indicates confusion between mar-
ital relations and marital property. The precept is doubtless sound
for business enterprises and one thesis of this discussion is in-
deed to urge its incorporation as one element of adjustment of
community property problems. When husband and wife are each
running a separate business or attempting to hold separate jobs,
the good management, thrift, luck, or what have you, of the one,
cannot save the other but both businesses must stand or fall to-
gether. Thus, there is no real head to either. Moreover, short of
disturbance of the marital relationship, there is no way to get
one. There is no machinery for getting a new manager in time
to prevent disaster. Enterprise is discouraged. Lending agencies
are wary. Conveyancers are uneasy. Spouses become frustrated
and dissatisfied and not only may the business associations fall
but they may take the marital association with them.
Simple legislative curatives may be found. Oklahoma's plan
for control by the wife earning separately from the husband
seems feasible and certainly had nothing to do with the state's
apparent distaste for any and all community property systems.8 '
This plan provided for completely separate control and man-
agement of the two endeavors when both spouses were sep-
arately engaged in ventures for material gains.82 Creditors reli-
ance was upon but the one business which they had furnished
unless other voluntary arrangements were made. Obviously,
proper recordation for their protection was necessary. While
Oklahoma apparently instituted the system for tax purposes
80. Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 41 So.2d 837 (1949).
81. See discussion of repeal and its aftermath by Trice, Community Prop-
erty in Oklahoma, 4 SOUTHWESTERN L.J. 38 (1950).
82. See Daggett, The Oklahoma Community Property Act-A Cornpara-
tive Study, 2 LouisANA LAw RviEw 575 (1940).
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only and abandoned it after the tax need had passed,8  they
nonetheless were aware of conditions prevailing when they
sought to institute the system and made proper provision to
avoid the situation presently prevailing in Louisiana. It is of par-
ticular present interest that the French commissioners engaged
in preparing a revision of the French Civil Code for possible
adoption have decided upon split control provisions similar to
those outlined in this article, evidencing the existence of the
same dissatisfactions presently manifested in Louisiana. 84
If the Oklahoma or a similar plan were adopted, provision
could be made within the pattern for title certainty when prop-
erty stands in the wife's name. Obviously, that item might be
cared for without adoption of a comprehensive control plan and
is being presently urged by some thoughtful persons who are
particularly interested in that phase of the confusion.
(b) Balance and Equality. Certainly sources of community
and separate property whatever they may be should be the
same for both spouses that equitable division might be made at
the dissolution of the community. Obligations to each other
should be the same and the Code so states. 85 Support of the wife
by the husband rises from the relationship, 86 and is recognized
by the necessity doctrine87 and by alimony provisions even after
divorce.8 Proper emphasis would not seem to have been placed
upon the wife's assumption of similar responsibilities to the hus-
band specifically provided by the Code during marriage at
least.8 9 Redistribution of wealth by the tax method materially
reduces the monetary importance of separate property acquired
by inheritance and gift of great fortunes and small, thus in-
creasing the need for balance and equity in community regula-
tions.
(c) Marriage Contract. Spouses should be able to organize
their business affairs as financial advantage or security dictates.
They should be able to reorganize their business affairs if their
marital happiness tends to be affected by them. Permission to
make a marriage contract during marriage would be a very
simple change in the law.9 0 The machinery governing marriage
83. See note 73 supra.
84. See note 94 infra.
85. Art. 119, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
86. Art. 120, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. See also LA. R.S. § 14:74 (1950).
87. Art. 1786, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
88. Art. 160, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
89. Arts. 2389, 2435, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
90. Art. 2329, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
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contracts is still intact.9 1 Sufficient modification of the action for
separation of property to make the device effective would not
be unduly complicated.
A traditional fear seems to be that domestic felicity might
be disturbed if such contracts were allowed. The present fear
is that much disturbance will result if the relief continues to be
disallowed. Moreover, marriage contracts of the past were really
made by parents in the interest of their children. This stage of
economic and social life has passed in Louisiana for better or
worse. The hard realities of life fortunately do not cloud the
proper bliss of courtship, thus few contracts at all are made. If
permitted later when time, thought and experience might dic-
tate a need for rearrangement in the interest of the marriage,
and with present day participation by the wife in business, much
good might be accomplished. It seems uniquely Victorian that
the most interested of all parties may not contract with each
other.
Another fear seems to be that the greedy, jealous, dominant
spouse might browbeat the amiable or timid one into signing a
bad contract. Obviously, dictators in homes and out of them prob-
ably will always exist regardless of preventive legislation and
can do little if any more harm to a marriage with right of con-
tract than without it. Moreover, the law presently contains the
protection of the marital portion, 2 the provision for sharing of
marital establishment expenses by those separate in property s
and other wise provisions to meet obvious contingencies.
Little change may be needed but it is needed badly if the
community property system is to survive and survive as a pro-
tector of family finance and a binder and promoter of emotional
security and satisfaction rather than a wedge for disintegration
of all of these elements. These pages are not to say with D. H.
Lawrence "Let there be a parliament of men and women for
the careful and gradual unmaking of laws" but to urge the
repair of these laws at the earliest possible date that their origi-
nal purpose and usefulness may be retained. The mail shirt of
indifference is a poor shield against the effects of maladjusted
provisions of marital property law.
When the thoughts of the fine minds of the leaders of Lou-
91. Art. 2325 et seq., LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
92. Art. 2382, LA. Cnn. CODE of 1870.
93. Art. 2435, LA. CxvIL CODE of 1870.
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isiana come to be turned to a recognition and solution of these
problems, doubtless most equitable and satisfactory measures
may be devised without reference to suggestions most humbly
suggested here as mere possibilities.9 4
94. See Ancel, The Revision of the French Civil Code, 25 TULANE L. REV.
435, 444 (1951); Clark, Management and Control of Community Property in
New Mexico, 26 TULANE L. REV. 324 et seq. (1952); Daggett, Is Joint Control
01 Community Property PossibZef, 10 TULANE L. REv. 589 et seq. (1936).
